ABSTRACT In this comment paper, we point out a security flaw in a data access control system which is built on ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) and attribute-based signature schemes. In particular, we show that the underlying CP-ABE is vulnerable to the collusion attack. As a result, malicious users can collaborate to decrypt a ciphertext, which they are not authorized to decrypt.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, Huang et al. [1] proposed a secure data access control system with ciphertext update and computation outsourcing features for fog computing applications. Their system makes use of CP-ABE scheme to achieve finegrained access control in which a data owner can specify an access policy T a as metadata on the ciphertext, such as Owner OR {IT AND Admin}. A ciphertext can be decrypted successfully by a user who holds the secret key SK with attribute set S that can satisfy T a . A basic security requirement for CP-ABE is collusion resistant in which users should not be able to combine their secret keys to compile an universal attribute set S * to satisfy a T a which cannot be satisfied when they are alone.
Huang et al. provided a brief security analysis to claim the data confidentiality, fine-grained access control, authentication and collusion resistant for the proposed access control system. We observed that the collusion resistant property is the most important among all as the other security claims will be falsified if the access control system is vulnerable to collusion attack. Moreover, we noticed that although the security assurance in the access control system was claimed (in the Section VI of [1] ) to be inherited from Zhang et al.'s [2] CP-ABE scheme, the CP-ABE scheme in the access control system was modified and no new security proof was provided. Therefore, Huang et al. ' s CP-ABE scheme should be viewed as a newly proposed CP-ABE scheme without proper security analysis and this motivates our cryptanalysis. Our result shows that Huang et la.'s CP-ABE scheme is not collusion resistant and subsequently the other security claims for the access control system are invalid as well.
II. CRYPTANALYSIS
In this section, we show how to mount a collusion attack on Huang et al.'s CP-ABE scheme. We do not recall Huang et al.'s CP-ABE scheme [1] as it is out of the scope of this comment paper.
In order to ease the explanation, we assume the following scenario. Users A and B collude together by combining their secret keys SK A , SK B to decrypt user V's ciphertext CT . SK A contains an attribute IT , SK B contains an attribute Admin and CT contains the access policy T a = {IT AND Admin}. Obviously, either user A or B alone cannot decrypt CT as their respective attribute cannot satisfy T a . However, we show that they still can decrypt CT by mounting the collusion attack as follows.
1) Given the information on hand:
users A and B wish to combine their secret key to decrypt user V's ciphertext: 
3) Next, user A computes:
and includesD * A ,D B into his SK A . At this point, user A already possessed sufficient attributes S = {IT , Admin} and the corresponding secret key elements to satisfy T a . 4) Now, user A is ready to decrypt CT by calculating:
and followed by:
where IT ,S (0) and Admin,S (0) are Lagrange coefficients for the polynomial p R (x). 5) Subsequently, user A computes:
γ A βt to obtain the symmetric key DK such that:
and finally recovers M by decrypting C = SE DK (M ) using DK .
III. DISCUSSION
The vulnerability in Huang et al.'s CP-ABE scheme is caused by the improper bonding among user secret key elements which yields the removal of the masking exponent γ in the elementD. Furthermore, since the hash value H 1 (attr) inD is not tided to D, the removal of γ allows one to freely addingD andD into his secret key. In addition, as attackers are able to construct the desired secret key as in Step 3 of Section II, they can operate the ciphertext algorithm also, which subsequently affect the security of the ABS scheme.
We are not sure how to fix the problem as it is caused by the KeyGen algorithm in the CP-ABE scheme. Amending the algorithm affects the rest of the algorithms and one might as well replace the CP-ABE scheme in the access control system with another provably secure CP-ABE scheme. However, the replacement may cause the system to lost its advantages of ciphertext updating and computing outsourcing, though finegrained access control property is maintained.
